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Governance and Legitimacy
Keynote Speech Held at the Opening Conference 
of the Research Center (SFB) 700, Berlin, February 23, 2007
Robert O. Keohane
Introduction
I have been asked to speak on governance and legitimacy. I initially demurred, since your con-
ference is on areas of limited statehood and my work is on global institutions. But Thomas 
Risse assured me that the literature on global governance is relevant, and that students of limi-
ted statehood may be able to learn from students of global governance. Since Thomas is very 
persuasive, and since I expect that the reverse is at least equally true, I agreed to come. What 
I will try to do is to propose some general standards for legitimacy in situations lacking both 
strong government and genuine democratic publics, and then to apply these standards to four 
diﬀ erent types of situation involving limited statehood. The standards that I will propose re-
present an adaptation of standards proposed in an article recently published by Allen Buchanan 
and myself (Buchanan/Keohane 2006)1.  Professor Buchanan should get credit for developing 
many of the arguments, but no blame for the way in which I have adapted them for this pur-
pose. 
My analysis tonight is normative but is linked to empirical issues. So let me fi rst comment 
briefl y on positive rather than normative issues. How should we understand governance in 
situations of limited statehood?
This afternoon Beth Simmons provided three features of situations that could be taken, in 
my view, to defi ne situations of limited statehood: 1) no monopoly on force; 2) a lack of the 
credible rule of law; and 3) low ability to make coherent decisions for a collectivity. Of course, 
these conditions help to defi ne a continuum between a positive ideal type of stable constitu-
tional government, on the one hand, and a negative ideal type of statelessness, on the other. 
Situations of limited statehood fall toward the negative side of the continuum. 
Situations of limited statehood call to mind Hannah Arendt’s defi nition of power as the capacity 
to act in concert. In this sense, situations of limited governance are situations of low power. Much 
force may be in evidence, but there is little power in Arendt’s sense. Here I want to support a 
point made by Georg Sorensen in his intervention this afternoon: we need fi rst of all to under-
stand weak statehood and its persistence. That is, if we understand why situations of limited 
power in Arendt’s sense persist, we will more readily be able to understand, and to make judg-
ments about, failures of governance. 
In these situations of limited statehood, perhaps we should not entirely be asking: what coll-
ective decisions make sense in these circumstances? We might want to ask, equally, how indi-
1 For citations to secondary materials, not found in this text, please see that reference.
viduals should be expected to act when collective decisions are not feasible. Hobbes may be as 
relevant as R. H. Coase and Douglass North, especially in situations toward the negative pole of 
statelessness. Hobbes famously described a “war of all against all” in such situations. Nothing 
is worse. If this is the alternative to poor governance in situations of limited statehood, it puts 
the issue of legitimacy in context. Governance will not be good. We need to ask whether it is 
acceptable. 
‘Legitimacy’ has both a normative and a sociological meaning. To say that an institution is legi-
timate in the normative sense is to assert that it has the right to rule – where ruling is promulga-
ting rules and attempting to secure compliance with them by attaching costs to noncompliance 
and/or benefi ts to compliance. Ruling in this broad sense does not require that the rules be 
backed by coercion, much less that the rule-maker claims a rightful monopoly on coercion wi-
thin a jurisdiction, so it does not presuppose the state. An institution is legitimate in the socio-
logical sense when it is widely believed to have the right to rule. Sociological legitimaicy refl ects 
the aggregate normative views of large numbers of people. 
This talk is concerned with the normative dimensions of such institutional legitimacy: under 
what conditions should governance institutions, in situations lacking strong governmental in-
stitutions and democratic publics, be considered legitimate? 
The normative standpoint that I begin with is liberal democratic theory, interpreted in a con-
sequentialist way. Two fundamental principles of democratic people are that individuals ought 
to be free to make decisions for themselves and that they should be treated equally. It follows 
that where collective decisions are required, each person should have an equal voice. Further-
more, publics should be able to act collectively. A public can be defi ned as a set of people who 
communicate with each other and view themselves as a group that should be making collective 
decisions. In my view, it is desirable that publics be able to make such decisions, with each per-
son having an equal voice. The liberal aspect of democratic theory requires constraints on those 
in power. At a minimum, institutions of governance should limit and constrain the potential 
for abuse of power, through a combination of checks and balances and accountability. Such 
accountability should whenever feasible include accountability to publics in freely contested 
elections under universal suﬀ rage. When I say that I interpret liberal democratic theory in a 
consequentialist way, I mean that the ultimate justifi cation of the liberal democracy is that it 
can be expected to provide better opportunities for individuals to lead autonomous lives in 
which they can fulfi ll their inherent capacities. If following liberal democratic norms worsened 
human opportunities for such meaningful lives, it would not necessarily be justifi ed to do so. 
It almost goes without saying that liberal democratic theory does not match well with the ac-
tual practices of situations of limited statehood. Liberal democratic theory certainly would not 
describe the situation of global governance, either. For someone who believes in democratic 
theory, but wants to be relevant to diﬃ  cult situations such as these, the problem is how to adapt 
the very high standards appropriate to ideal democracies, in such a way that is relevant to these 
more troubled conditions. 
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This means, of course, that in real-world politics the normative and empirical aspects of legi-
timacy are linked. It would be unrealistic to apply very high standards of democratic to global 
governance or situations of limited statehood. No feasible institutions would be legitimate. The 
concept of legitimacy would therefore provide us with little leverage for distinguishing among 
governance institutions, or even for criticizing them in a way that could lead to improvements. 
We are in the realm of second-best: or third or fourth best!
 
Three Desiderata
I will begin by oﬀ ering three desiderata that, in my view, any set of standards for evaluating the 
legitimacy of governance institutions must meet. First, they must provide a basis for coordina-
ting support for the institutions. Second, they should take justice into account but not identify 
legitimacy with justice. And third, they should enable us not only to evaluate the legitimacy of 
governance institutions in a static way, but to evaluate the path of institutional change.
 
(1) Coordinating support 
Governance institutions are valuable because they create norms and information that enable 
actors to coordinate their behavior in mutually benefi cial ways. They can reduce transaction 
costs, create opportunities for actors to demonstrate credibility, and provide public goods. Ho-
wever, an institution’s ability to perform these valuable functions will depend in substantial 
measure on whether those to whom it addresses its rules regard them as binding. 
Once an institution is in place, on-going support for it and compliance with its rules is some-
times simply a matter of self-interest from the perspective of states, assuming that the institu-
tion actually achieves coordination or other benefi ts that all or at least the more powerful actors 
regard as valuable. Similarly, once the rule of the road has been established and penalties are 
in place for violating it, most people will fi nd compliance with it to be rational, from a purely 
self-interested point of view. But in global governance and situations of limited statehood, we 
cannot rely on self-interest, since penalties for non-compliance may often be unlikely. Hence 
legitimacy carries an especially heavy weight of institutional maintenance – precisely in situa-
tions where we might expect legitimacy to be low in the fi rst place. 
The general point is that judgments of legitimacy will depend signifi cantly on our anticipation 
of what institutions will be regarded in the domain as legitimate. A set of institutions that mat-
ches less well to ideal democratic principles, but that performs a strong coordination function 
because its provisions resonate with widely-held beliefs, may be normatively superior – accor-
ding to my consequentialist democratic theory – to a set of institutions that is more ideally 
democratic, but less in tune with prevailing beliefs. 
I have stressed that agreement on standards for legitimacy can facilitate valuable coordination 
of support for governance institutions. However, if it becomes widely understood that an in-
stitution does not measure up to the standards, then the result may be lack of coordination, at 
least until the institution changes to conform to the standards or a new institution that better 
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conforms to them replaces it. The function of legitimacy judgments is to make possible coor-
dinated support for institutions based on normative reasons rather than simply on grounds of 
self-interest, while at the same time supplying a critical, but realistic minimal normative stan-
dard by which to determine whether institutions are worthy of support. 
(2) Justice and legitimacy  
Justice is an ideal standard, whereas legitimacy expresses a threshold value, in a non-ideal world, 
for the conditions under which an institution has the right to rule. Justice and legitimacy are 
therefore closely related but they are not the same. Withholding support from institutions be-
cause they fail to meet the demands of justice would be self-defeating from the standpoint of 
justice itself, because progress toward justice requires eﬀ ective institutions. To mistake legiti-
macy for justice is to make the best the enemy of the good.  Yet if an institution is suﬃ  ciently 
unjust, whatever moral reasons there are for supporting it will be overwhelmed by its extreme 
injustice. To remain legitimate, a governance institution must provide for continuing delibera-
tion about what justice requires and how the institution ought to contribute to it. 
(3) Dynamic Evaluation
Finally, a relevant standard of legitimacy should take into account the direction of change. A 
variety of pathways may exist by which governance institutions may become more legitimate 
on consequentialist democratic grounds. It is possible that what seems to be a superior insti-
tution in a static sense will occupy only a local maximum, without the ability to improve; while 
what appears to be an inferior institution will have the capacity for improvement. Under such 
conditions, the institution with the capacity to improve might well be more legitimate, from a 
long-term perspective, even if at the moment it is somewhat inferior. 
Four criteria 
I now put forward four criteria for the legitimacy of institutions. The fi rst of these criteria is mi-
nimal moral acceptability. Governance institutions, like institutions generally, should not persist 
in committing serious violations of human rights, injustices and if they do we should not take 
their rules as binding or otherwise support them. Unsurprisingly, there is disagreement among 
basic interest theorists of human rights as to exactly what the list of human rights includes and 
how the content of particular rights is to be fi lled out. However, there is agreement that the list 
includes the rights to physical security, to liberty, and the right to subsistence. Assuming that 
this is so, we can at least say this much: governance institutions, and institutions generally, are 
legitimate only if they do not persist in violations of the least controversial human rights. 
When we see the grievous injustices of our world and appreciate that ameliorating them re-
quires institutional actions, we are quick to attribute obligations to institutions and then criti-
cize them for failing to fulfi ll those obligations. However, it is one thing to say that it would be a 
good thing if a particular governance institution took on certain functions that would promote 
human rights; it is quite another to say that it has a duty to do so and that this duty is of such 
importance that failure to discharge it makes the institution illegitimate. It may be that the in-
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justices we observe are due to fundamental conditions beyond the ability of any institution to 
control, and that attributing them to the institution is to confuse cause with eﬀ ect. 
In my view, the standard of legitimacy should require minimal moral acceptability, but should 
also encourage the possibility of developing more demanding requirements of justice for at least 
some of these institutions. 
The second criterion is comparative benefi t. The justifi cation for having governance institutions 
is primarily if not exclusively instrumental: we value them principally because of the benefi ts 
they bring. ‘Benefi t’ here is necessarily comparative. The legitimacy of an institution is called 
into question if there is an institutional alternative, providing greater benefi ts, that is feasible, 
accessible without excessive transition costs, and meets the minimal moral acceptability crite-
rion. If an institution steadfastly remains instrumentally suboptimal when it could take steps 
to become signifi cantly more eﬃ  cient or eﬀ ective, this impugns its legitimacy. In other words, 
when assessing the legitimacy of an institution we always have to ask: as compared to what?
In my scale of values, these fi rst two criteria are the most important, the sine qua non. Regimes 
that fail on either standard are illegitimate. The next two criteria are important, but more a 
matter of degree. All governing institutions, even democratic ones, fail them to some extent. In 
situations of limited statehood, and globally, the conditions for receiving a high rating on these 
standards are rarely present, and one must expect to have to lower the bar to be realistic in one’s 
application of democratic theory. 
The third criterion is institutional integrity. If an institution exhibits a pattern of egregious dis-
parity between its actual performance, on the one hand, and its self-proclaimed procedures 
or major goals, on the other, its legitimacy is seriously called into question. An institution is 
presumptively illegitimate if its practices or procedures predictably thwart the credible pursuit 
of the very goals in terms of which it justifi es its existence. If an institution fails to satisfy the 
integrity criterion, we have reason to believe that key institutional agents are either untrust-
worthy or grossly incompetent, that the institution lacks correctives for these defi ciencies, and 
that therefore the institution is unlikely to be eﬀ ective in providing the goods that would justify 
taking its directives as binding.
Integrity and comparative benefi t are related but distinct. If there are major discrepancies bet-
ween an institution’s behavior and its prescribed procedures and professed goals, then we can 
have little confi dence that it will succeed in delivering the benefi ts it is supposed to provide. 
However, integrity is a more forward-looking, dynamic virtue than comparative benefi t, which 
measures benefi t solely in terms of the current situation. If an institution satisfi es the criterion 
of integrity, there is reason to be confi dent that institutional actors will not only deliver the be-
nefi ts that are now taken to constitute the proper goals institutional activity, but also that they 
will be able to maintain the institution’s eﬀ ectiveness if its goals change. 
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Minimal moral acceptability, comparative benefi t, and institutional integrity are plausible stan-
dards for the legitimacy of governance institutions. All three conditions are always relevant, 
but trade-oﬀ s between them must frequently be made and as I have noted, minimal moral ac-
ceptability and comparative benefi t are of the greatest importance. Gross violations of human 
rights cannot be countenanced. And how much we expect of an institution should depend, in 
part, upon how valuable the benefi ts it provides are and whether there are acceptable, feasible 
alternatives to it. For example, we might be warranted in regarding an institution as legitimate 
even though it lacked integrity, if it is nonetheless providing important protections for basic 
human rights and the alternatives to relying on it are grim.
My fourth and fi nal condition for legitimacy is epistemic quality. At a minimum, the institution 
must not be based on beliefs that are not palpably false, and must report fairly accurately on 
its activities. Institutions based on racism, for example, are ipso facto illegitimate because be-
liefs about racial superiority are demonstrably incorrect. Institutions that systematically distort 
information so that it is the opposite of the truth – as in Stalinist Russia – are also ipso facto 
illegitimate. Legitimate institutions can survive widespread knowledge of their activities. To 
provide any assurance of epistemic quality, institutions also need to be, to a reasonable extent, 
accountable and transparent. 
 Accountability and Transparency
Accountability includes three elements: (1) standards that those who are held accountable are 
expected to meet; (2) information available to accountability-holders, who can then apply the 
standards in question to the performance of those who are held to account; and (3) the ability 
of these accountability-holders to impose sanctions: to attach costs to the failure to meet the 
standards. The need for information about whether the institution is meeting the standards 
accountability-holders apply means that a degree of transparency regarding the institution’s 
operations is essential to any form of accountability.  
Almost all institutions are accountable to someone – if only to the criminal gang or the “God-
father” behind the scenes. So accountability per se is not suﬃ  cient; it must be the right sort of ac-
countability. At the very least, this means that there must be eﬀ ective provisions in the structure 
of the institution for holding institutional agents accountable for acting in ways that ensure sa-
tisfaction of the minimal moral acceptability and comparative benefi t conditions. Furthermore, 
there must be provisions for revising existing standards of accountability and our conception 
of who the proper accountability holders are and whose interests they should represent.
Achieving transparency is often touted as the proper response to worries about the legitimacy 
of governance institutions. However, to suggest that transparency ensures legitimacy is ina-
dequate. For transparency to be eﬀ ective, information about how the institution operates must 
be accessible at reasonable cost; properly integrated and interpreted; and directed to accountabi-
lity-holders who are adequately motivated to use it properly in evaluating the performance of 
the relevant institutional agents. 
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Legitimate governance institutions should possess three epistemic virtues. First, because their 
chief function is to achieve coordination, they must generate and properly direct reliable infor-
mation about coordination points; otherwise they will not satisfy the condition of comparative 
benefi t. Second, because accountability requires transparency, they must be transparent in sen-
se of making information available about themselves.  They must also have eﬀ ective provisions 
for integrating and interpreting the information current accountability-holders need and for 
directing it to them. Third, and most demanding, they must have the capacity for revising the 
terms of accountability over time.  
Even then, the eﬀ ects of transparency will not always be benign. Indeed, under some circum-
stances transparency can have malign eﬀ ects. As David Stasavage points out, “open-door bargai-
ning…encourages representatives to posture by adopting overly aggressive bargaining positions 
that increase the risks of breakdown in negotiations.” Our claim is not that outcomes are neces-
sarily better the more transparent institutions are. Rather, it is that the dispersal of information 
among a plurality of external epistemic actors provides some counterbalance to informational 
asymmetries favoring insiders. There should be a very strong but rebuttable presumption of 
transparency, because the ills of too much transparency can be corrected by deeper, more so-
phisticated public discussion, whereas there can be no democratic response to secret action by 
bureaucracies not accountable to the public. 
Having articulated a set of standards for institutional legitimacy, I now argue that they meet the 
three desiderata for a standard of legitimacy I set out earlier. First, the standard provides a rea-
sonable basis for coordinated support of institutions that meet the standard. It only requires a 
consensus on the importance of not violating the most widely recognized human rights, broad 
agreement that comparative benefi t and integrity are also presumptive necessary conditions of 
legitimacy, and a commitment to inclusive, informed deliberation based on transparency and 
accountability. In other words, the complex standard steers a middle course between requiring 
more normative agreement than is available in situations of limited statehood and abandoning 
the attempt to construct a more robust, shared normative perspective from which to evaluate 
governance institutions. 
Second, in requiring only minimal moral acceptability at present, the standard I have proposed 
acknowledges that legitimacy does not require justice, but at the same time aﬃ  rms the intuiti-
on that extreme injustice, understood as violation of the most widely recognized human rights, 
robs an institution of legitimacy. Finally, by requiring a dynamic rather than simply a static 
evaluation of institutions – looking at pathways of institutional change as well as performance 
right now – the standard refl ects a proper appreciation of the dynamic, experimental character 
of governance institutions in situations of limited statehood. 
Applying the Standards
Setting out a set of normative standards for the legitimacy of governance institutions is only 
the easy part of the task. The diﬃ  cult part is applying them to particular situations, in context. 
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The close connection between normative and empirical aspects of legitimacy means that the 
character of domestic publics, and their prevailing beliefs, will be crucially important in such 
applied evaluations. Since ideal democratic publics do not exist – certainly not in situations of 
limited statehood or globally  – here will always be tradeoﬀ s between closer approximation to 
democratic ideals and institutional robustness. Building stronger institutions is very likely to 
require normative sacrifi ces and vice versa.
At the global level, I am inclined not to apply the standards too strictly, since institutions are 
crucial for interstate cooperation, and cooperation is essential to achieve peace, prosperity, en-
vironmental protection, human rights and many other values that are extremely important. 
International institutions usually, it seems to me, meet the comparative benefi t criterion since 
the alternative is often discord and unilateral or regional action. They never commit massive 
violations of human rights. They are more likely to allow such violations by others, as in Rwanda 
and now the Sudan – and this inaction should be severely criticized. The fact that an institution 
is weak does not make it illegitimate. If it did, the cure would be worse than the disease, wea-
kening the institution further. Global institutions too often lack integrity, since hypocrisy is 
associated with dependence, and they are dependent on states, which themselves are often hy-
pocritical. Such institutions have substantial transparency, more because they are too fragmen-
ted to keep secrets than because they systematically publicize relevant information. They are all 
quite accountable to someone – partly because they are weak – although rarely democratically 
accountable. In general, I see most multilateral institutions as seriously fl awed on the basis of 
my democratic legitimacy standards, but not illegitimate.  Insofar as collective choices are nee-
ded – whether one’s own state should support the multilateral organization, my inclination is 
not to let objections on grounds of legitimacy get in the way, if the purposes of the activity are 
morally valid and the means chosen to achieve them seem appropriate. 
In situations of limited statehood, the issue is more diﬃ  cult. Four diﬀ erent sets of situations 
can be distinguished, as follows:
States or multilateral organizations may have come to exercise rule over 
peoples a territory not legally their own, and may need to make decisions 
about whether to turn rule over to a government composed of residents of 
the territory. 
Outsiders may need to decide whether to recognize, or to aid, existing go-
vernments of other states, and may need to make judgments of legitimacy as 
part of this process. 
We may want to make historical judgments on situations in the past, such 
as the British colonialism in North America considered by the project on 
governance in situations of limited statehood.
Outsiders or insiders may want to make judgments about the legitimacy 
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Exercising Rule or Turning it Over?
The United Nations in Bosnia, and now in Kosovo, had to govern the country for some time, and 
in so doing, had to decide whether local governance institutions were suﬃ  ciently legitimate for 
power to be devolved to them. It is a pressing question right now whether the Kosovo Albanians 
would form a government for the whole area that, if given sovereignty, would meet the stan-
dard. My inclination is to answer this question in the negative, since there is no Kosovar public 
– Albanians and Serbs being too divided – and there is little evidence that such a government 
would follow minimal human rights standards toward the Serb minority. My formulation of 
legitimacy suggests that following human rights standards is more important than sovereignty 
and territorial integrity per se, and that Kosovo should therefore either be divided before sove-
reignty is given to the Albanian majority, or should remain in a quasi-sovereign status. An Alba-
nian Kosovar government that fails to respect the human rights of its Serb population should 
not be recognized.  
The United States faced a similar choice in Iraq when it returned sovereignty to an Iraqi govern-
ment. The United States has to reconsider the legitimacy of the Shiite-led government every 
day, in deciding how much authority to give it over policing in its own territory. That govern-
ment seems clearly to fail all of the standards I have enunciated. It either commits gross human 
rights violations, including torture and murder, or allows them to go unpunished. Indeed, its 
prime minister recently responded to accusations by a Sunni woman of rape by Shiite forces by 
trying, in all too familiar ways, to discredit the woman who brought the charge, rather than by 
undertaking a serious and impartial investigation. The government seems to provide fewer net 
public benefi ts than would be provided by a quite conceivable authoritarian government that 
kept sectarian groups under control. Its behavior continually belies the words of democracy 
and equal rights that its spokesmen, at least when speaking to the American public, mouth. 
If this government met the minimal moral acceptability and comparative benefi t criteria, one 
might be inclined, on the theory I have outlined, to loosen considerably the standards for inte-
grity, transparency, and accountability. But it fails the fi rst tests. 
Of course, to stay that the Shiite-led government in Iraq fails the legitimacy test does not tell us 
what feasible government would pass it. Certainly Saddam’s regime, with its minority rule and 
its systematic use of torture, terror, and murder, failed it fl at. So does foreign rule by the United 
States, which can never be legitimate for Iraqis and therefore guarantees armed insurgency and 
all the brutalities, on both sides, that armed insurgency, supported by the population, against a 
militarily dominant occupier, generates. Since there is no coherent public in Iraq, with a sense 
of collective we-feeling, it is diﬃ  cult to see the prospect for any government that meets the 
legitimacy standard. Not realizing that this would be the likely outcome of an invasion will be 
the enduring shame of the American and British political elites – not just the governments and 
parties and power but, with some honorable exceptions, the “political class” in general. 
Faced with no good options, I am thrown back on the theological distinction between sins of 
commission and sins of omission. It is worse actively to commit injustice than merely to allow 
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it to happen, especially when one cannot make the situation better over the long run. United 
States troops are a target now for all sides, from Sunni insurgents to Shiite militants. Their 
vulnerability, and lack of ability to communicate eﬀ ectively with Iraqis, ensures that they will 
continue to commit a number of injustices, largely as a result of understandable over-reactions 
under pressure. Hence their continued presence in the country for an indefi nite period of time 
seems diﬃ  cult to justify, in view of the diﬃ  culty that they could make the situation better over 
the long run. In my view, therefore, the United States should leave Iraq on a strict timetable of 
not more than one year. Other states in the region, and the Iraqis themselves, will have to take 
more responsibility to prevent disaster. 
In Kosovo, by contrast, my judgment is that the United Nations should not hand over power to 
the Kosovar Albanians until a fair settlement is made for the Serbs, either letting their territory 
be part of Serbia or waiting for a Kosovar government that can credibly promise to protect their 
rights. 
Supporting Governments?
The other public choice that could be aﬀ ected by legitimacy judgments is whether to support 
a regime that has clear democratic defi ciencies but is likely to be superior to any feasible suc-
cessor. Consider the government of Pakistan under President Musharref. The government is 
non-democratic – but previous, nominally democratic governments had a feudal base, were 
very corrupt, and failed to maintain order in the country. It also appears to lack integrity and 
transparency, allowing its intelligence services, or branches of them, to support the Taliban 
while nominally joining the American-led War against Terror. However, it is easy to imagine a 
government in Pakistan that would perpetuate much worse abuses against human rights than 
the present government does – for instance, a government that was run by a ruthless military 
dictator repressing all dissent, or by Islamic fundamentalists. Indeed, such a government might 
well follow the Musharref government. So on the standard of comparative benefi t, the Mushar-
ref government ranks higher than such a hypothetical regime, and might well pass the test. 
I am not suggesting that actual policy is made only, or even substantially, on the basis of prin-
ciples of legitimacy. With respect to American and European policies toward Pakistan, interests 
are trump. But I am suggesting that the standard of legitimacy that I suggest could justify sup-
port for the Musharref regime. 
This judgment may make the standard seem too fl exible. I do not think, however, that it is. Con-
sider Zimbabwe. The Mugabe regime is clearly illegitimate on the basis of the standards I have 
enunciated. It lacks integrity, accountability and transparency – but so do some regimes that I 
have reluctantly concluded are “above the bar”. The regime violates human rights in fl agrant 
ways, although in this respect, many regimes worldwide seem worse. It is on the comparative 
benefi t criterion that the crucial failure occurs. Robert Mugabe himself demonstrated over the 
course of many years that Zimbabwe could be governed by a much better regime, which provi-
ded more material benefi ts, and greater protection of human rights, than the current regime. 
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His own past regime therefore oﬀ ers proof that the current Zimbabwean regime fails the stan-
dard of comparative benefi t and is therefore illegitimate. 
An Historical Example: The Early American Experience 
The leaders of this project are interested in situations in the relatively distant past, such as Bri-
tish colonialism in North America, so let me comment on one set of historical questions, having 
to do with the treatment of native Americans – Indian tribes – by Britain and the United States 
between 1750 and 1850. 
Britain was allied with some Indian tribes, such as the Iroquois, while its French enemy was 
allied with others. Considerable fi ghting occurred on the frontier, with massacres occasionally 
taking place on both sides. Britain, however, sought to prevent white settlers from breaching 
boundaries between their land and that of the Indians. They were not very successful in this 
regard, as white settlement increased, but British policy was suﬃ  ciently pro-Indian to generate 
resentment by the English-speaking inhabitants of the colonies. 
With American independence, policies became more pro-settler. Early Federalist governments 
nevertheless sought to control settler depredations, but by the time of the Andrew Jackson 
administration, beginning in 1829, that policy changed. Jackson, who had made his reputation 
fi ghting Indians, successfully sought the forcible removal of the Five Civilized Tribes from their 
ancestral lands in the Southeast. In what became known as the Trail of Tears, many innocent 
Indians died.
So with respect to the treatment of the Indians, how do British colonialism and American fron-
tier democracy stand up to the criteria of legitimacy that I have outlined? On the minimal moral 
acceptability criterion, Britain passes and Jacksonian America fails. On the comparative benefi t cri-
terion, Jacksonian America also fails. Both British rule and Federalism rule were vastly superior 
for the Indians – the original occupants of the land. 
Only on the integrity and accountability-transparency criteria does Jacksonian America do well 
– but as I have argued, this is not suﬃ  cient for failure on the two principal criteria. Jackson and 
his allies were frank about their policies. President Jackson said in a message to Congress in 
December 1830:
„What good man would prefer a country covered with forests and ranged by a 
few thousand savages to our extensive Republic, studded with cities, towns, and 
prosperous farms, embellished with all the improvements which art can devise 
or industry execute, occupied by more than 12,000,000 happy people, and fi lled 
with all the blessings of liberty, civilization, and religion?“
 
The Jackson Administration regarded treaties not as moral obligations but as matters of expe-
diency. As expressed by Government George C. Gilmer of Georgia:
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„Treaties were expedients by which ignorant, intractable, and savage people were 
induced without bloodshed to yield up what civilized peoples had a right to 
possess by virtue of that command of the Creator delivered to man upon his 
formation – be fruitful, multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it.“2 
Even some adored American statesmen adopted similar attitudes, before Jacksonian democra-
cy. The American negotiators at the Treaty of Ghent in 1814, led by John Quincy Adams and 
Henry Clay, said the following in defense of their policies of seizing Indian lands and violating 
treaty obligations:
“They will not support that [Great Britain] will avow, as the basis of their policy 
towards the United States, the system of arresting their natural growth within 
their own territories, for the sake of preserving a perpetual desert for savages.” 
(American State Papers: 1814)
Deciding on Specifi c Institutions
Finally, under what conditions are such institutions as public-private partnerships legitimate 
in situations of limited statehood? I suggest, rather tentatively in view of my lack of empirical 
knowledge, that the standards of legitimacy I have suggested could also apply here. Minimal mo-
ral acceptability, comparative benefi t, integrity, and epistemic quality (including transparency and ac-
countability) all seem relevant to the analysis of such institutions. Once again, the comparative 
benefi t criterion is crucial: as compared to what? Since costs and benefi ts are at issue, introducing 
a political economy perspective into the project, if possible with some applied economists in-
volved, would seem highly worthwhile. 
Conclusion
I have proposed a standard of legitimacy for governance institutions and have given some ex-
amples of how I think it should be applied, globally and in situations of limited statehood. 
Global institutions are relatively new and still evolving; in situations of limited statehood, go-
vernance institutions are often very new and changing very fast. Under these conditions it is 
diﬃ  cult to make fi rm judgments. Nevertheless, I hope that a principled proposal for a standard 
of legitimacy such as the one I have suggested could, if it garners suﬃ  cient support, serve as 
a focal point for provisional support while at the same time providing guidance for improve-
ment and leverage for stimulating institutional change. In view of the choices that need to be 
made on a continuing basis, there is an urgent need for a shared evaluative perspective that is 
suﬃ  ciently critical, yet not so demanding as to make coordinated, normatively-based support 
for governance institutions under diﬃ  cult conditions unlikely. My hope is that the standards I 
have proposed this afternoon could constitute a fi rst step toward meeting this need. 
2 Both quotes are from Prucha (1962: 242).
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Legitimacy in Normative and Positive Theory: Comments on Robert O. Keohane 
Fritz W. Scharpf
As was to be expected from its author, this is an excellent paper – thoughtful, clearly argued and 
convincing as far as it goes. I have no disagreement with its substantive propositions on the 
legitimacy of governing institutions. Instead, my comments will address some of the meta-the-
oretical or methodological issues relating to the role of these propositions within the context of 
SFB 700 and its research program on “Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood”
My fi rst comment responds to Keohane’s own doubts about the assumed parallelism between 
the focus of his own current work on the legitimacy of global governance institutions and is-
sues of legitimacy in areas of limited statehood. In my view, these doubts are justifi ed for two 
reasons: First, where they are eﬀ ective, global institutions are secondary governments which de-
pend on primary governments at the national and sub-national levels for the implementation 
and enforcement of their decisions. In other words, they generally do not have to face the target 
populations of their policies directly. As a consequence, the requirements of their legitimacy 
may diﬀ er from, and may be less stringent than the standards applied to primary governments.1 
Keohane seems to acknowledge as much when he denies the possibility of legitimate local or 
national governance institutions in areas like Kosovo or the Iraq because, in the absence of a 
“coherent public” and a “collective we-feeling”, there could be no accountability. For institu-
tions of global or even European governance, by contrast, there is no claim that their legitimacy 
should depend on the existence of coherent publics or collective we-feelings. 
Moreover, in our normative evaluation of global or European institutions, there is no question 
that we are also entitled to apply our own standards of legitimacy. Since these secondary go-
vernments claim authority over our own primary governments, and thus indirectly over us, we 
should of course judge their legitimacy by our own lights. But it should also be understood, 
as Keohane points out, that these will be our standards for secondary governments, and that we 
would not, and should not, hold the EU or the WTO to the same standards that we apply to our 
primary governments. It is less self-evident, however, that our own standards are equally rele-
vant for judging the legitimacy of primary governments other than our own. 
Keohane approaches this question by distinguishing between a “normative” and a “sociological” 
meaning of legitimacy. The former refers to arguments asserting the “right to rule”, whereas 
the latter would ask whether an institution “is widely believed to have the right to rule”. He also 
suggests, however, that these empirical beliefs must themselves be about the normative right to 
rule, rather than merely beliefs about others’ opinions. That is indeed so. Nevertheless, it is also 
true that legitimacy beliefs have varied, and do vary, across time and space, cultural and religi-
ous traditions, and across contemporary political ideologies. 
1 That is diﬀ erent in cases of humanitarian intervention by the UN, NATO or the EU – whose legiti-
macy, as Keohane points out, must then be judged by the standards that apply to primary govern-
ments. 
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Now, Keohane’s paper is meant as a contribution to the normative, rather than positive, theory 
of governance institutions. By itself, that would not rule out attention to the variance of legi-
timating arguments. Even if we should share Max Weber’s view of the irreducible pluralism 
of normative orientations, normative research could still clarify the premises and explore and 
compare the implications of belief systems other than our own. Keohane, however, has opted 
for a monistic approach which, at the same time, claims universal relevance. His starting point 
is a commitment to the normative standpoint of “liberal democratic theory, interpreted in a 
consequentialist way”. I see no reason to dispute the implicit claim that this position, and the 
emphasis on liberty, equality, checks and balances, accountability and universal suﬀ rage, could 
and would fi nd broad support in all advanced Western democracies. Yet Keohane also acknow-
ledges that “it almost goes without saying that liberal democratic theory does not match well 
with the actual practices of situations of limited statehood”. 
But this is meant as a concession to problems of feasibility, rather than as an acknowledgment 
of normative pluralism. Moreover, feasibility is to be understood in the context of a research 
program which equates “limited statehood” with a lack of eﬀ ective governing capacities: At the 
extreme, “failed” states are totally incapable to implement and enforce their policies, whereas 
in “weak states” and “threshold countries”, the eﬀ ective powers of governments are somewhat 
greater, but still incomplete in comparison to the Western model (Risse/Lehmkuhl 2006: 10-
12). If under these circumstances one should nevertheless wish to evaluate the legitimacy of 
existing institutions, it is clear that liberal-democratic standards cannot be fully applied: They 
would indeed, as Keohane says,  “provide us with little leverage for distinguishing among go-
vernance institutions, or even for criticizing them in a way that could lead to improvements. We 
are in the realm of second-best, or third or fourth best.” 
As a consequence, Keohane proposes to relax – step-wise, presumably – the requirements of the 
liberal-democratic model to a point where their realization would seem feasible in the context 
of existing governing capacities. His main point, however, is that there must also be an absolu-
te minimum standard, below which the legitimacy of governing institutions must be denied, 
regardless of all considerations of feasibility. The explication and illustrative application of 
these minimum requirements is the main subject of Keohane’s contribution, and I fi nd his 
arguments in this regard highly persuasive. What I fi nd more debatable are the reverse implica-
tions of the logic of his argument.
If the minimum standards are reached by relaxing the requirements of the Western model in 
response to given defi cits of governing capabilities, it also seems to follow that standards must 
again be raised to require closer approximations of the model if governing capabilities are seen 
to increase – from failed states to weak states and in threshold countries. In fact, Keohane says 
as much when he talks about the “pathways […] by which governance institutions may become 
more legitimate on consequentialist democratic grounds”. But this raises an obvious problem: 
By any standard, Singapore does not seem to be a case of “limited statehood”. Similarly, Saudi 
Arabia or Iran seem to have considerable governing capacities, and even North Korea, while 
lacking many capabilities of modern statehood, would probably not be classifi ed as a “failed 
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state” without an eﬀ ective monopoly of violence. Yet none of these regimes could be described 
as approximations of the liberal-democratic model. By the same token, it is at least not certain 
that increasing governing capabilities in areas of limited statehood would put failed states on a 
“pathway” toward liberal democracy. For all we know, the normative goal of institutional deve-
lopment could also be the ideal Islamic theocracy or a variant of autocratic paternalism.
In his normative discussion, Keohane makes no allowance for such possibilities. In the logic 
of his argument, Western standards may have to be relaxed for reasons of feasibility, but they 
cannot be replaced by non-Western criteria of legitimacy. In other words, at all levels of institu-
tional development, non–Western regimes would have to be classifi ed as being non-legitimate.2 
In purely normative discourses, we are of course free to argue for a position of monistic univer-
salism –  just as Islamic fundamentalists are free to defi ne all Western regimes as illegitimate. 
But would that be equally acceptable when normative discourses are transposed into policy 
recommendations, and when the postulated illegitimacy of a target regime may be used as an 
argument that could justify armed intervention – or suicide attacks, for that matter?  I am confi -
dent, however, that in the role of a consultant Keohane would invoke a wide range of additional 
arguments before arriving at policy recommendations and, in any case, this is not an issue I 
want pursue here.  
Instead, I am concerned about the relationship between normative analyses and empirical re-
search, or more specifi cally, between normative and positive theorizing, in the context of the 
broader research program. Even though we are free to opt for a monistic approach in our nor-
mative theory of legitimacy, we are not similarly free to disregard the existing plurality of legi-
timating beliefs in our positive theories.3 In a defi nition widely used at the Berlin conference, 
“legitimacy” refers to patterns of voluntary compliance that are based on a sense of normative 
obligation, rather than on sanctions and control. So understood, the concept defi nes a factor 
that may greatly reduce the costs, and increase the eﬀ ectiveness, of governing. It may thus aﬀ ect 
the success or failure of given governance institutions, and it may help to predict their resi-
lience under pressure and their responsiveness to externally introduced changes. But in order 
to arrive at these explanations and predictions, we need to identify the legitimating beliefs that 
are in fact held by the target populations of the regimes studied. If these are ignored in norma-
tive analyses, the relationship between the normative and positive theorizing could only be one 
of mutual irrelevance.
In my view, that would be unfortunate. The empirical research program of SFB 700 could be 
sensitized to possible diﬀ erences in legitimacy beliefs by comparative normative analyses that 
would identify the presently competing political philosophies, and spell out their implications 
2 By contrast, John Rawls – to whom Keohane referred in the discussion, and who surely is deeply com-
mitted to the values of liberal democracy – does make allowance for a second category of legitimate, 
but non-liberal governance which he calls “decent peoples” – and which are to be distinguished from 
illegitimate “outlaw states” (Rawls 1999).
3 If we did, we might repeat the errors of explanation and prediction that had caused the rapid demise 
of the unidirectional “Modernization” theories of the 1960s, cf. Hagopian (2000).
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for judgments on the legitimacy of governing institutions. In light of the pragmatic aspirations 
of the program, it would also be interesting to learn about areas of normative overlap –  propo-
sitions, that is, that are derived from diﬀ ering normative premises but appear to be suﬃ  ciently 
similar to facilitate agreement on common standards of legitimacy. Conversely, empirical re-
search could contribute to comparative normative analyses by identifying governance practices 
and institutions which are in fact considered legitimate by their respective constituencies. In 
this fashion, it might even be possible to contribute to Keohane’s primary interest in mini-
mum standards of legitimacy by identifying the lowest common denominator of normative 
propositions and empirical beliefs about legitimate governance institutions. 
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